Directive, Delegative, Decentralised or Disastrous?
Re-reading a book about the North Africa Campaign of the Second World War, I was struck by the leadership and management dynamics of the British Eighth Army during a particularly low point in their fortunes. This was the time of "the Cauldron" when for at least three days the main part of the DAK (the German "Afrika Korps") lay trapped and ready to be annihilated, only for the British to do nothing; then with the DAK resurgent, the British thought they still had the Germans on the ropes... until Tobruk fell with the surrender of around 35,000 South African and Indian troops.
The fault lay not with the troops who surrendered, nor with those who escaped back to the Egyptian border, but rather with the top levels of command in the Eighth Army. General Auchinleck (the "Auk"), C-in-C for the Middle East issued commands from his Cairo base, based on the reports he received from the field commander, General Ritchie. Ritchie in turn issued commands to his subordinates, the Divisional Commanders, and they in turn to the regimental and brigade commanders. The problem was that virtually no one in the chain of command saw an order as an order; at every level, the person on the spot felt able to ignore or alter orders because of their greater appreciation of the situation (as they saw it). To compound the problem, General Ritchie often acted as if his commands had been carried out, even when he knew they hadn't. This led to the Auk telling the Prime Minster that things were going well and the DAK close to defeat at the very time when in fact the Eighth Army had just lost their last 150 capable tanks (leaving them with just 50 very incapable "I" - Infantry - tanks), the Gazala line had been abandoned and Rommel was steaming towards Tobruk.
Unfortunately, just this kind of breakdown in command, communication, intelligence - even reality - happens in organisations today.
Broadly speaking, there are three valid approaches to leadership and management. One is "Directive" - what we might call command and control. I issue an order - and I follow up to ensure it has been carried out. In the course of following up, I may become aware of factors which have arisen which lead to me modifying my original order; but an order is just that - not a suggestion. And I am very much in the loop.
The second valid approach is what we might call "Delegative". Essentially this is about agreeing what the overall plan and the required outcomes are and then delegating the responsibility for execution to subordinates. My role then becomes one of ensuring that they have the resources they need, that any road-blocks are removed, that any changes in the environment which require a change in plan are addressed in a timely manner. The objective is still the objective and the plan needs to be executed - and, yes, I am still very much in the loop.
The third valid approach is one we could label "Decentralised". This is taking Delegative a step further: we agree what the required outcomes are, but the plan and its execution and the monitoring of the immediate environment and reshaping of plans are down to the unit leaders. I simply monitor results against agreed outcomes. I am available if they need my input. Because I am watching outcomes like a hawk - guess what: I am still very much in the loop.
Which one of these is best? Surprise, surprise - they all work wonderfully well in the right setting; provided everyone knows and sticks to the same approach. In theory, the Eighth Army was Directive. In both theory and practice the DAK was Decentralised - and it was the alignment of theory and practice that was the DAK's strength. Where the Eighth Army broke down (until the coming of Alexander and Montgomery) was that the Auk and Ritchie acted as though they were Directive, expected that they had to live with something more like the Delegative model - when in fact the regimental and brigade commanders often acted as if they were Decentralised; and both the Auk and Ritchie were so far from being in the loop that when reality threatened to break in, they actively pushed it away.
With hindsight, Montgomery was far from being a brilliant field commander. He was often woefully pedantic, BUT: he shook Eighth Army by the throat and let them know that henceforth, there was going to be one way - HIS way - and that any disagreement ("bellyaching") would lead to rapid reassignment to the rear echelon, regardless of the bellyacher's rank. Aligning the theory and practice of leadership was enough to tip the balance and (thanks to the Allies' greater numbers, which they had always enjoyed but rarely profited from) win the campaign.
The moral of this story might be something like, "there are many ways to lead and manage, so choose your model - and then stick to it relentlessly."
The fault lay not with the troops who surrendered, nor with those who escaped back to the Egyptian border, but rather with the top levels of command in the Eighth Army. General Auchinleck (the "Auk"), C-in-C for the Middle East issued commands from his Cairo base, based on the reports he received from the field commander, General Ritchie. Ritchie in turn issued commands to his subordinates, the Divisional Commanders, and they in turn to the regimental and brigade commanders. The problem was that virtually no one in the chain of command saw an order as an order; at every level, the person on the spot felt able to ignore or alter orders because of their greater appreciation of the situation (as they saw it). To compound the problem, General Ritchie often acted as if his commands had been carried out, even when he knew they hadn't. This led to the Auk telling the Prime Minster that things were going well and the DAK close to defeat at the very time when in fact the Eighth Army had just lost their last 150 capable tanks (leaving them with just 50 very incapable "I" - Infantry - tanks), the Gazala line had been abandoned and Rommel was steaming towards Tobruk.
Unfortunately, just this kind of breakdown in command, communication, intelligence - even reality - happens in organisations today.
Broadly speaking, there are three valid approaches to leadership and management. One is "Directive" - what we might call command and control. I issue an order - and I follow up to ensure it has been carried out. In the course of following up, I may become aware of factors which have arisen which lead to me modifying my original order; but an order is just that - not a suggestion. And I am very much in the loop.
The second valid approach is what we might call "Delegative". Essentially this is about agreeing what the overall plan and the required outcomes are and then delegating the responsibility for execution to subordinates. My role then becomes one of ensuring that they have the resources they need, that any road-blocks are removed, that any changes in the environment which require a change in plan are addressed in a timely manner. The objective is still the objective and the plan needs to be executed - and, yes, I am still very much in the loop.
The third valid approach is one we could label "Decentralised". This is taking Delegative a step further: we agree what the required outcomes are, but the plan and its execution and the monitoring of the immediate environment and reshaping of plans are down to the unit leaders. I simply monitor results against agreed outcomes. I am available if they need my input. Because I am watching outcomes like a hawk - guess what: I am still very much in the loop.
Which one of these is best? Surprise, surprise - they all work wonderfully well in the right setting; provided everyone knows and sticks to the same approach. In theory, the Eighth Army was Directive. In both theory and practice the DAK was Decentralised - and it was the alignment of theory and practice that was the DAK's strength. Where the Eighth Army broke down (until the coming of Alexander and Montgomery) was that the Auk and Ritchie acted as though they were Directive, expected that they had to live with something more like the Delegative model - when in fact the regimental and brigade commanders often acted as if they were Decentralised; and both the Auk and Ritchie were so far from being in the loop that when reality threatened to break in, they actively pushed it away.
With hindsight, Montgomery was far from being a brilliant field commander. He was often woefully pedantic, BUT: he shook Eighth Army by the throat and let them know that henceforth, there was going to be one way - HIS way - and that any disagreement ("bellyaching") would lead to rapid reassignment to the rear echelon, regardless of the bellyacher's rank. Aligning the theory and practice of leadership was enough to tip the balance and (thanks to the Allies' greater numbers, which they had always enjoyed but rarely profited from) win the campaign.
The moral of this story might be something like, "there are many ways to lead and manage, so choose your model - and then stick to it relentlessly."
